Hardware-based zero-knowledge strong authentication (H0KSA)

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods are provided for a device to engage in a zero-knowledge proof with an entity requiring authentication either of secret material or of the device itself. The device may provide protection of the secret material or its private key for device authentication using a hardware security module (HSM) of the device, which may include, for example, a read-only memory (ROM) accessible or programmable only by the device manufacturer. In the case of authenticating the device itself a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge may be used. The zero-knowledge proof or zero-knowledge proof of knowledge may be conducted via a communication channel on which an end-to-end (e.g., the device at one end and entity requiring authentication at the other end) unbroken chain of trust is established, unbroken chain of trust referring to a communication channel for which endpoints of each link in the communication channel mutually authenticate each other prior to conducting the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and for which each link of the communication channel is protected by at least one of hardware protection and encryption.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.12/732,168, filed Mar. 25, 2010, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S.patent application Ser. No. 12/643,972, filed Dec. 21, 2009, whichclaims the benefit of priority of U.S. Provisional Application No.61/182,623, filed May 29, 2009, all of which are hereby incorporated byreference.

BACKGROUND

1. Technical Field

Embodiments of the present invention generally relate to securefinancial transactions initiated from an electronic device and, moreparticularly, to the ability to use the phone function (e.g., of amobile handset) to feed data back to a Trusted Integrity Manager as partof a Mobile Embedded Payment program in the financial industry toauthenticate users (e.g., a consumer).

2. Related Art

In direct (face-to-face) or online financial transactions customers maysearch for and purchase products and/or services from a merchant. In thecase of online shopping, transactions are conducted through electroniccommunications with online merchants over electronic networks. A varietyof electronic devices and various electronic techniques may be used toconduct such electronic transactions. Methods of initiating or makingfinancial transactions from an electronic device include, for example,SMS (Short Message Service), radio frequency identification (RFID) ornear field communication (NFC) at a point-of-sale (POS), and mobileInternet-based payments, by which customers search for and purchaseproducts and services through electronic communications with onlinemerchants over electronic networks such as the Internet. Such electronictransactions may be conducted via wireless communication, also referredto as “over-the-air” (OTA) communication—which may include ordinary(e.g., longer distance) radio frequency (RF) communication; mid-rangecommunication such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth; or short-range RFID or NFC,for communication over a distance that is typically less than about 4inches). Such transactions may be conducted, for example, with a cellphone using the cell phone's normal RF communication or using NFC if thecell phone is NFC-enabled. Other mobile devices, in addition to cellphones, that may provide OTA communication for facilitating suchtransactions may include, for example, radio frequency-enabled creditand debit cards, key fobs, mobile Internet devices, consumer electronics(not limited to, but as an example, a contactless and proximity enabledpersonal computer or laptop) and contactless and proximity enabledpersonal digital assistants (PDA).

When registering a mobile device or conducting a financial transactionvia any kind of consumer electronic device (CED), security is generallyan issue in that data transferred wirelessly may typically includecredit card and financial instrument information such as a user name,account number, a PIN, and a password, for example, that are susceptibleto theft or malicious attack. In addition, a number of parties may beinvolved in the transaction including, for example, a customer or user,a merchant, a mobile network operator (MNO), a service provider (SP), atrusted service manager (TSM), a mobile phone manufacturer, anintegrated chip (IC) manufacturer, and application (software)developers. Another central issue with consumer electronic devices—suchas a personal computer (PC), a laptop, mobile phone, NFC enabled mobiledevice, for example, or other CEDs—is the need for cooperation betweenthe many involved parties, in addition to financial institutions, tomeet the needs of the customer via a secure over-the-air link.

SUMMARY

According to one or more embodiments of the present invention, a mobileembedded payment (MEP) system operated, for example, by a financialservice provider (FSP) in the financial industry includes a TrustedIntegrity Manager (TIM)—which may also be referred to as a TrustedAuthentication Provider (TAP)—as part of, or functioning in conjunctionwith, a Trusted Service Manager (TSM). TIM enables the ability to usethe phone function of a mobile handheld device to feed data (including,e.g., time and geo-location) back to the TIM to authenticate users inthe context, for example, of financial transactions. TIM works with TSM,which may be loosely described as a primitive key management system. TIMprovides additional security, especially with payment applications. TIMincludes many different sub-systems, and modules and components withinthe sub-systems. TIM works with the TSM to provide additional securitybetween entities (e.g., mobile device, payment provider, financialinstitution) in secure transactions.

In one embodiment, TIM is added to a TSM that manages financial-relatedcommunication between carriers, consumers, retailers, and financialinstitutions. Conventional TSM has only a Trusted Service Provider (TSP)and a Trusted Third Party (TTP) component. TSP functions include selectand validate, manage, and monetize applications. TTP functions includeSIM (Subscriber Identity Module) issuing, OTA personalization, and lifecycle management of the hardware (e.g., for SIM software). The functionsof the TIM include performing various service processes which mayinclude, for example, validating, provisioning via TTP, authorizing, andre-issuing various pieces of information inside a mobile device (alsoreferred to as mobile handset but not limited only to handsets) of aconsumer or user. The TIM also manages and makes sure the data forvalidation of a transaction are handled securely from a remote location(TSM in itself may be like a large central remote processor ofelectronic data, payment or non payment). By coupling the TIM function,acting as a server in a conventional client-server architecture, in theTSM and an embedded secure element (eSE) acting as aclient—implementations of various embodiments may rely, for example, oneSE, Secure Memory Card, or Universal Integrated Circuit Card(UICC)—inside the handset, a new level of verification and security isadded.

Initially, the TTP provides a SIM key(s) to a carrier. The carrier thenactivates the service with a user when a user purchases a handset andthe service. This is a usual activation. Through an application (alsoreferred to as “app”) on the handset—which may be purchased anddownloaded, for example, via an application store such as App Store™, atrademark of Apple, Inc.—the user requests enablement of paymentfunctions on his or her handset. In order to achieve a higher level ofsecurity, a payment secure element, SE, embedded with the RF chip (orworking in conjunction with the RF chip) serves as a repository of allfinancial critical data inside the handset. The application downloadedis to be verified by the TSM/TSP prior to being downloaded. Whendownloaded over the air (OTA), the application is installed in theproper SE and memory area by the TTP. Additionally a logical switch isactivated to turn on the payment SE and link it to the SIM for User/IMEI(International Mobile Equipment Identification) parameters binding. Datafor validation is to be sent back to the TIM to create a profile. Themobile device becomes effectively a payment device with securityparameters stronger than existing models. The payment engine iscontained in the embedded SE, while non-critical or properly authorizedapplications reside in the SIM card.

A second step—e.g., after provisioning of a SIM card and enablement ofpayment functions, at which juncture the SIM card is then referred to asthe “provisioning SIM”—is provisioning of a payment instrument. The userrequests his/her payment card to be installed on the phone, i.e.,handset or device. Since the device is mobile, the original request goesto the TSP (which can be through a specific bank wallet for example).The TSP then requests validation, verification, and authorization thatthe specific instrument that has been requested is a legitimateinstrument for that user. When the authorization from the bank isreceived by the TSM, the information is sent to the TIM to be validatedand packaged in the proper format for the handset and to be understoodby the embedded SE payment engine, e.g., a Mobile Embedded Payment (MEP)client.

The TIM then passes the “package” to be installed into the embedded SEto the TTP who will OTA install the “package” on the handset. At no timeis the TTP aware of the encryption or keys used. Within the paymentengine, e.g., embedded SE, all the payment instruments are to bevalidated by the TIM to be executed on the handset, and their integrityis to be checked on a regular basis against the TIM knowledge.Furthermore, some data linked to the user and handset could be used bythe TIM to verify identity or authorization credentials on transactionsin a regular acquiring process that is beyond what is done in the priorart. This includes, but not limited to, feeding back time andgeo-location data from the device to the TIM to cross reference merchantID (strong non-repudiation), user ID (strong user protection) and deviceID (strong integrity of payment instruments used for banks) as well aslocation and time of a transaction. Geo-location could be important foruser protection to make sure the user and device binding known by theTIM does match with the merchant acceptance device (known location infinancial network) and the handset used for the payment (e.g., samecity, same country).

In another embodiment, a consumer electronic device—for example but notlimited to: a personal computer (PC), a laptop, a mobile phone, anNFC-enabled mobile device, a NetTop or NetTV—determines whether a properSIM card (or UICC, for example, or other uniquely identifiable availablenetwork communication element appropriate to the device) is present,whether a connection to the mobile network operator is present, whetherdata has been changed in the device's embedded SE, and whether an actualSIM card is present. Based on these conditions, the user is allowed,e.g., by a Trusted Remote Attestation Agent (TRAA), specific use of thedevice for NFC payments, for example, or other OTA or wirelesslyconducted transactions. More specifically, for example, an NFC-enabledmobile device may have TRAA software running on an embedded SE in thedevice. The embedded SE is in communication with the device SIM card.The TRAA software runs to check whether data in the secure element hasbeen changed. If so, and there has been no confirmation from the TSM orTIM through the mobile network, the device is locked and cannot be useduntil confirmation of the change can be made, such as through the TSM ora call to the FSP. TRAA also checks whether the SIM card present isactually the SIM card used to provision the phone (the provisioningSIM), such as by matching the SIM card unique ID with what is expected.If the SIM card is not the provisioning SIM or if a SIM card is notpresent, the device is held until the provisioning SIM is available. TheTRAA also checks whether there is a connection to the network and TSM.Such a situation may arise, for example, when the device is in a foreigncountry, underground, or in a tunnel. If the provisioning SIM is notavailable, a predetermined transaction cap is imposed, such as $50, andtransactions more than the predetermined transaction cap (or a totalamount) are denied until the network becomes available again forcommunication with the TSM. This conditional denial reduces risk offraudulent purchases.

In one embodiment a system includes: a device including a hardwaresecurity module (HSM) in which the HSM protects a secret material sothat the secret material is inaccessible by unauthenticated andunintended entities and the HSM communicates via a protectedcommunication channel with an entity; and the device is configured toengage in a zero-knowledge proof with the entity via the communicationchannel to authenticate the secret material. In another embodiment, amethod includes: protecting a secret material in a hardware securitymodule of a device; establishing an end-to-end chain of trust over acommunication channel, in which: the channel has two endpoints, thehardware security module being at one of a first endpoint and a secondendpoint; and an unbroken chain of trust is established between thefirst endpoint and the second endpoint of the channel; andauthenticating the secret material in which the first endpoint andsecond endpoint engage in a zero-knowledge proof via the communicationchannel to authenticate the secret material. In another embodiment, amethod includes: protecting a private key in a secure vault of a device;and using a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with the private key asproof material to authenticate the device so that the private keyremains private to the device.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a system diagram illustrating an ecosystem for financialtransactions using a mobile phone function in accordance with anembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a system diagram illustrating a portion of the ecosystem ofFIG. 1 relative to a Trusted Service Manager (TSM) in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 3 is a system block diagram illustrating TSM components inaccordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 4A is a functional block diagram illustrating an example of systemlevel functions of a Trusted Integrity Manager (TIM) in accordance withan embodiment.

FIG. 4B is a system block diagram illustrating an example of TIMsubsystems and organization in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a system diagram illustrating a first example of TSM and TIMlocations in an ecosystem for financial transactions in accordance withan embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a system diagram illustrating a second example of TSM and TIMlocations in an ecosystem for financial transactions in accordance withan embodiment.

FIG. 7 is a system diagram illustrating a third example of TSM and TIMlocations in an ecosystem for financial transactions in accordance withan embodiment.

FIG. 8 is a system diagram illustrating payment and application flows inan ecosystem for financial transactions in accordance with one or moreembodiments.

FIG. 9 is a process flow and interaction diagram illustrating systeminteractions for an ecosystem for financial transactions using a mobilephone function in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 10 is a sequence of user interface displays illustrating an exampleof a “one-touch-one-tap” payment process in accordance with anembodiment.

FIG. 11 is an entity-relationship diagram illustrating secure identitybinding (SIB) in accordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 12 is a system block diagram illustrating an example ofhardware-based zero-knowledge strong authentication (H0KSA) according toone embodiment.

FIG. 12A is a flowchart diagram illustrating a method for hardware-basedzero-knowledge strong authentication according to an embodiment.

FIG. 13 is an entity-relationship diagram illustrating trusted remoteattestation agent (TRAA) system level operational relationships inaccordance with an embodiment.

FIG. 14 is an example of an interactive phishing detection (IPD) visualindicator in accordance with an embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments of the present invention relate to mobile embedded payment(MEP) systems and methods for providing secure financial transactionsover a network using a Trusted Service Manager. In one embodiment, aTrusted Integrity Manager (TIM)—which may also be referred to as aTrusted Authentication Provider (TAP)—is provided in addition to aTrusted Service Manager (TSM) that manages financial-relatedcommunication between carriers, consumers, retailers, and financialinstitutions. The TIM (acting, e.g., as MEP system server and providingvarious service processes) and the ability to use the phone function(acting, e.g., as MEP client) to feed data back to the TIM are novelconcepts in the financial industry. By coupling the TIM server functionsto an embedded secure element (eSE) client inside the handset, a newlevel of verification and security may be introduced into the financialindustry.

The functioning of the TIM may be considered the “trust foundation” ofthe TSM and enables a financial service provider (FSP)—such as PayPal,Inc.—to provide provisioning services but also to operate anauthentication service. TIM provides key pieces, for example, of the“remote” communications involved in using near-field communications(NFC) and other wireless or OTA communications for transactions,enabling applications to be trusted, and removal of liability associatedwith trusted application execution on user handsets, by strongly bindingthe user, the account and payment instrument, the value instrument,e.g., coupon or ticket, and the device to a central trusted and liableback-end entity. Another function of the TIM is similar to a keymanagement authority (KMA) or controlling authority (CA).

The MEP system may include a back-end infrastructure and variousbusiness services. For example, one business service may include anon-card fingerprint authentication that operates using a fingerprintdigital image stored or processed in the eSE vault of the FSP. The eSEvault may be located on the user's mobile handset, for example. Aspecific cryptographic authentication protocol may be used to make surethe “live reading” (e.g., real-time processing) of the fingerprint isproperly matched with a tagged stored image on the chip, e.g., IC chipused to implement the eSE. The processing includes a dual real-timematching that is novel compared to the way on-chip fingerprintauthentication is typically performed.

Also, for example, another business service may include anauthentication service that incorporates the possibility of leveraginggeo-location information from the handset, fingerprint strongauthentication, device marking, timestamp, and other types of data thatmay be considered raw data. Some of these types of data may be provided,for example, by the carrier (e.g., mobile network operator). The batchof raw data may be used to provide an additional tool of risk assessmentto issuing banks in addition to the usual transaction data the issuingbanks received via the acquiring network. From the batch of data, theFSP may control the level of risk to be tolerated and fine tune the riskassociated with the use, for example, of the NFC-enabled mobile phone orother wireless or OTA-communicating devices.

For example, if the phone is offline, the FSP could implement aparameter in the eSE to limit spending to a pre-determined dollar amountper day before requiring a forced (e.g., mandatory or prerequisite tofurther spending) access to the network. The parameter may also allowhaving a counter-reset in the eSE in compliance with EMV requirements(EMV is a standard for interoperation of IC chip cards, the letters EMVbeing taken from Europay-Mastercard-Visa). This capacity to work offlinemay be enabled by profiling of user, device, and transaction. Having asmart counter associated with the MEP client may allow managing ofvarious parameters to authorize or decline a transaction without goingback to the FSP cloud (see, e.g., FIG. 5). Such parameters may include,for example, a cash reserve, preset, or prepaid dollar amount on theuser mobile device linked to the back-end FSP balance (but not allowedto exceed the balance); a number of transactions authorized; or a dollaramount limit—such as $100 a day with a request to connect back to theFSP cloud, when getting close to the limit, for verification andupdating of the profile parameters. The smart counter may also includethe capacity to keep a history log of the offline transactions to updatethe FSP cloud when connecting back.

Returning to the raw data provided for the authentication service, ifthe user desires to skip the fingerprint, the FSP could, for example,attach a higher risk to the transaction or require the input of afingerprint for transactions above a certain threshold related to theparameters. In the case, for example, of P2P (point-to-point) NFC forclassified transactions, the authentication service may allow the FSP tosend over the air (OTA) a pre-verified certificate both for the vendorand the buyer, providing a cashless transaction with trusted payment. Atthe same time the buyer provides the pre-paid certificate to the seller,the seller will be informed that payment was completed and the buyerwill receive a certificate from the seller that indeed the payment wasreceived and the goods released. In that instance, the FSP may providereal-time micro escrow for both parties.

FIG. 1 is a system diagram illustrating an ecosystem 100 for financialtransactions using a mobile phone function. FIG. 1 shows a variance ofthe traditional “4-corners model” adapted to reflect the specificitiesof the mobile ecosystem 100. FIG. 1 shows information and monetary orcredit flows 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111 that may take place betweenvarious entities (e.g., 102, 104) in support of or in consequence of afinancial transaction between a consumer 102 and a merchant 104 in thecase that an issuer 106 (e.g., credit card company or bank) and anacquirer 108 (e.g., a part of a bank that receives and pays out funds asopposed to the part that issues credit, the issuer) are involved. Asshown in FIG. 1, flows 103, 105, 111, 113 between merchant 104 andacquirer 108 may involve communications and transactions flowing throughnetworks 110 and banks 112. Similarly, as seen in FIG. 1, flows 115,117, 119, 121 between consumer 102 and issuer 106 may involvecommunications and transactions flowing through networks 110, banks 112,and financial institutions (FI) 114. When additional functionality forusing a mobile handset 116 to facilitate a transaction is provided inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention,however, flows 115, 117, 119, 121 between consumer 102 and issuer 106may involve communications and transactions that involve additionalentities. Examples of such additional entities, as seen in FIG. 1,include mobile network operators (MNO) 118, manufacturers of integratedcircuit chips (Chip) 120, manufacturers and providers of mobile handsets(Handset) 122, and trusted service managers (TSM) 124 as defined by theGSMA (Global System for Mobile Association). Thus, there is a need tocoordinate various security and trusted management functions among theentities involved, including the additional entities.

FIG. 2 is a system diagram illustrating a portion 200 of the ecosystem100 of FIG. 1 relative to a Trusted Service Manager 124. FIG. 2 isillustrative of the variety of entities that a TSM 124 may interfacewith and perform services related to. As seen in FIG. 2, there may bemany parties in the ecosystem 100. For purposes of security and securecommunications, it may be assumed that none trusts (nor should trust)the others. Many of the TSM functions may be defined by integratedcircuit chip vendors 220 (e.g., providers of integrated circuits forhandsets and reading devices) and mobile carriers (e.g., mobile networkoperators 118). Services provided by such functions may be low level inthe sense that the services relate more to functioning of the hardwarethan facilitation of financial transactions. Thus, one or moreembodiments may provide functions and services additional to thoseprovided by a TSM 124. Such services may relate, for example, tosecurity, trust management, and shifting of liability.

FIG. 3 is a system block diagram illustrating some components of a TSM,e.g., TSM 124. Trusted Third Party (TTP) 302 may only manage thephysical aspects of the secure element (SE, see, e.g., FIGS. 4B, 5) suchas key management authority (KMA), memory allocation, pre- orpost-provisioning, and OTA conduits, for example. Thus, for example, TTP302 may provide a physical SD (Secure Domain; a secure memory card suchas a TrustedFlash card) controlling authority 304 and physical keymanagement 306.

Trusted Service Provider (TSP) 312 may only manage SE-related servicessuch as validation, service authentication, and application execution onor from the SE. For example, TSP 312 may provide an applicationauthentication 314 service and a service enrollment portal 316.

FIG. 4A is a functional block diagram illustrating an example offunctions that may be performed by a trusted integrity manager (TIM) 400as part of a mobile embedded payment (MEP) system. TIM 400 may provideliability management 401 in addition with other services includingsystem risk management 402, device risk management 403, and user riskmanagement 404. System risk management 402 may include, for example,strong authentication 4021, system security 4022, and system policy 4023(with regard to information security, also referred to as InfoSec).Device risk management 403 may include, for example, device IDverification 4031, device management 4032, and device policy 4033 (withregard to InfoSec). User risk management 404 may include useridentification 4041, user authentication 4042, and user policy 4043(with regard to InfoSec).

FIG. 4B is a system block diagram illustrating an example of TIM 400subsystems and organization. As shown in FIG. 4B, TIM 400 may include anumber of modules 410 through 490 for performing various functions andservice processes. A service process may be any process whichfacilitates performing a service, and may include, for example,processes that facilitate performing the functions described withreference to FIG. 4A. TIM 400 may include, for example, modules forprofile management 410, provisioning 420, console 430, authentication440, cryptography 450, device interrogation 460, device management 470,communication 480, and connector 490.

The module for profile management 410 may include device profiles 4101including, as seen in FIG. 4B, sets of profiles 4103 for mobile phones,televisions, set top boxes, NetTops, game consoles, and otherdevices—such as NetTVs. The module for profile management 410 may alsoinclude risk profiles 4102 including, as seen in FIG. 4B, a group ofprofiles for users 4104, a group of profiles for devices 4105, and agroup of profiles for systems 4106. Provisioning module 420 may includemodules 4202 for pre-provisioning, post-provisioning, onboard, and move.Console module 430 may include modules 4302 for operations (ops),logging, monitoring, tracing. Authentication module 440 may includemodules 4402 for hardware-based zero knowledge strong authentication(H0KSA), behavior, password (PWD), and biometric authentication.Cryptography module 450 (denoted “crypto” in FIG. 4B) may includemodules 4502 for a suite of algorithms, oblivious hashing (OH),verification, and key management. Device interrogation module 460 mayinclude modules 4602 for interrogation of SIM (Subscriber IdentityModules or SIM cards), eSE (embedded secure elements), applicationidentifiers, developer identifiers, TPM/MPM trusted platform module(TPM), mobile trusted module (MTM), GPS (global positioning system),platform identifiers, and stack identifiers. Device management 470module may include modules 4702 for SRUM, SIB (secure identity binding),TRAA (trusted remote attestation agent), wipe/lock, and delegate, andmodule 4704 for IPD (interactive phishing detection). Communicationmodule 480 may include modules 4802 for internet protocols (TCP/IP),telecom protocol, Near Field Communication/Bluetooth (NFC/BT), andsecure SMS (short message service). Connector module 490 may includemodules 4902 for Trinity/IAF (International Accreditation Forum, Inc.),AP (authentication provision), risk, and TSM (trusted service manager).

FIG. 5 is a system diagram—which may also be described as a bank centricmodel—illustrating a first example of TSM 124 and TIM 400 locations in amobile embedded payment (MEP) system 500 for financial transactions. Asshown in FIG. 5, TIM 400 functions may be included in an FSP (financialservice provider) cloud 502 with functions performed by the TSM 124.Thus, the TIM 400 and TSM 124 functions may both be provided by a singleservice provider, e.g., FSP 504. FIG. 5 also shows other features andelements that may be included in MEP system 500. MEP system 500 mayinclude a mobile phone handset 510 (shown as “mobile terminal” in FIG.5). Mobile device 510 may include a provisioning SIM card 512 and an eSE514 (embedded secure element). A secure communication link 513 insidemobile device 510 may connect provisioning SIM card 512 and eSE 514.Mobile device 510 may ordinarily communicate via link 515 through MNOcloud 506 with the outside world. Provisioning SIM card 512 may alsoconnect over link 517 with TIM 400. Mobile network operator (MNO) 508may communicate with TSM 124 and TIM 400 via link 519.

FIG. 6 is a system diagram illustrating a second example—which may alsobe described as a delegate or shared management model—of TSM 124 and TIM400 locations in a mobile embedded payment (MEP) system 600 forfinancial transactions. As shown in FIG. 6, TIM 400 functions may beperformed by a service provider, e.g., FSP 504 in FSP cloud 602,independently of a provider of TSM 124 functions. In the example shownin FIG. 6, TSM 124 functions may be performed by an MNO 508 or a thirdparty operating in conjunction with an MNO 508 in the MNO cloud 606. MEPsystem 600 may include a mobile device 510 connected via link 515 to MNO508. MNO 508 may communicate with TSM 124 via link 619. TSM 124 maycommunicate with TIM 400 via link 621. A provisioning SIM card 512 ofmobile device 510 may also connect over link 517 with TIM 400.

FIG. 7 is a system diagram illustrating a third example—which may alsobe described as a carrier centric model—of TSM 124 and TIM 400 locationsin a mobile embedded payment (MEP) system 700 for financialtransactions. As shown in FIG. 7, TIM 400 functions may be included withfunctions performed by a TSM 124 and the TIM 400 and TSM 124 functionsmay both be provided by an MNO 508 or a third party operating inconjunction with an MNO 508 in the MNO cloud 706 independently of afinancial service provider, e.g., FSP 504 in FSP cloud 702.

In the example shown in FIG. 7, MEP system 700 may include a mobiledevice 510 connected via link 515 to MNO 508. MNO 508 may communicatewith TSM 124 and TIM 400 via link 719. TSM 124 and TIM 400 maycommunicate with FSP 504 via link 721. An eSE 514 of mobile device 510may also connect over link 517 with FSP 504.

FIG. 8 is a system diagram illustrating payment and application flows inan MEP system 800 for financial transactions. FIG. 8 is similar to FIG.1 and provides a more detailed illustration of payment and applicationflows. Although, FIG. 8 shows TIM 400 included as part of a TSM 124,FIG. 8 is applicable to the configurations shown in FIGS. 5, 6, and 7.

FIG. 9 is a process flow and interaction diagram illustrating systeminteractions for an MEP system—such as MEP system 500, 600, 700, or800—for financial transactions using a mobile phone function. FIG. 9shows interactions and flows among the entities listed horizontallyacross the top of the diagram, which are: Users, Carrier (e.g., an MNO),TSM/TSP (which may be operated by FSP), TTP, TIM (which may be operatedby the FSP), and Bank (e.g., bank, credit card company, or otherfinancial institution). Also listed at the top of FIG. 9 is a columnlabeled “Flow” which describes the type of item involved in aninteraction between two entities as a sequence of events is traversed bymoving vertically down the diagram.

Groups of arrows in the diagram illustrate various events. So, forexample, the first event illustrated at the top of the diagram of FIG. 9may be the supplying of SIM keys (“SIM keys” shown in the “Flow” column)from the TTP to the Carrier (indicated by the arrow 902 from TTP toCarrier). After an initial purchase of handsets and services (secondentry in “Flow” column), the Carrier may activate service and a SIM cardID (third entry in “Flow” column) for a user, as indicated by the arrow904 from Carrier to Users.

The next group of arrows (beginning with arrow 906 from Users toTSM/TSP) indicates that a user may request the handset to be paymentenabled, which may involve the purchase of an app from TSM/TSP (arrow906), as described above, authentication and validation of the app bythe TIM (arrow 908), packaging by the TIM, and providing the appinformation to the TTP (arrow 910) for OTA installation (arrow 912) in asecure element (SE) of the handset, also as described above.

Provisioning of the handset, as described above, with a paymentinstrument (e.g., credit card, debit card, pre-paid card, or gift card)is also illustrated by the bottom set of arrows in FIG. 9, beginningwith arrow 914, representing request for provisioning by the user to theTSM/TSP. The request may be forwarded to a bank (arrow 916), which mayapprove funding (arrow 918), e.g., from a user bank account. TSM/TSP maynotify TIM that funding for the payment instrument is available (arrow920), which may be forwarded to the TTP (arrow 922) and OTA installationof the payment instrument on the mobile device may be provided by theTTP (arrow 924).

The user experience (also referred to by the FSP as “front end flow”)with regard to provisioning may described as follows: prior to using thepayment instrument on the handset, the user will download (from anapplication store, for example), or launch, the pre-installedapplication of the FSP from the handset. The request to launch, theapplication of the FSP can come from the user or can be instigated bythe carrier (e.g., MNO) or the bank upon enrollment of the handset tobecome a payment instrument. The application, also referred to as“Mobile Embedded Payment client” may be installed in the eSE (embeddedsecure element) and may also be referred to as FSP payment engine, FSPpayment vault, and FSP application.

When the FSP application is installed in the eSE, the FSP becomesde-facto controlling authority and takes ownership of the Issuing Domainon the eSE in accordance with industry accepted technology (including,for example, Global Platform specifications). This is one of the TIM 400functions in the background. The physical OTA function may be performedby a TTP/OTA partner. This requires a pre-provisioning that can bemanaged by silicon vendors or a post-provisioning, OTA mechanism to beput in place. There are, for example, known procedures that are alreadyused in the industry at production or post-production time.

When the application is installed and the handset becomes trusted, andif no payment instruments were pre-packaged with the FSP application,the user can request the installation of new or additional paymentinstruments. These must be installed in the eSE if using the full FSPpayment engine. However, in some cases, banks will want to maintain morecontrol and may request to have their application and instrumentresiding on the UICC/SIM of the mobile device (e.g., mobile device 510)to still leverage the FSP payment engine of another FSP. In that case,the FSP application will need to contain the proper credential to beauthenticated and authorized to be executed via the FSP payment engine.

FIG. 10 is a sequence of user interface displays illustrating an exampleof a “one-touch-one-tap” payment process in accordance with anembodiment. The user experience with regard to using the phone forpayment may described as follows: the user will launch the FSP “wallet”or the portion of the FSP application (client) not residing on the eSEfrom the user interface or by linking, or enrolling, the FSP applicationto the fingerprint (FP) reader. At interface displays 1001 to 1005, theuser will slide the user's finger across the FP reader and the user'sdefault FSP payment instrument will be launched. If no change isrequired, the user will tap his phone and proceed. In these exampledisplays, interface display 1001 shows a progress bar that animatesright to left and begins to move up to reveal the user's fingerprintthat has been touched to the FP reader. In interface displays 1002,1003, 1004, and 1005, the progress bar moves to the top of the displayrevealing more of the fingerprint as the progress bar moves, and thedisplay of the fingerprint may darken as the scan of the progress barmoves to the top of the display. At interface display 1011, the progressbar may change to a top banner indicating, for example, “Ready to Pay”.At interface displays 1012, 1013, 1014, and 1015, an image of a fundingcard, e.g., the default funding card, animates to the top of thedisplay, and buttons, e.g., “Cancel” and “Change”, appear once thefunding card reaches its final position. At this point, for example, anoption to change the funding source may be given to the user and thenthe user may need to go through one more display screen (e.g., interfacedisplays 1011 to 1015 over again) to pick up the desired funding source.Interface displays 1021 to 1025 show an example display for the useronce a payment has been made using the mobile device, e.g., mobiledevice 510. At interface display 1021, the “Ready to Pay” banner maychange to an animated “Processing” banner. At interface displays 1021,1022, and 1023, the funding card image may fade away as a receipt forpurchase comes into view. At interface display 1025, once the fundingcard image is off screen, purchase details and a “Done” button mayappear on the display, and the user may be given an option to terminatethe display. When the payment is completed, the FSP may be able toleverage the POS data to actually extract the store name, brand, andlocation, and from the UPC identify the product on the digital receiptthe user may want to use. The additional visibility for brand namesprovided by the “one-touch-one-tap” payment process may be an add-onservice to the merchant. In the process flow for the payment instrument,this visibility creates a difference from the conventional consumerexperience that at a retail store, the POS displays only the networks'brands (e.g., Visa °, MasterCard®, and others). The FSP payment enginemay allow an advantage as to bringing the bank (for example) brandpresence on the mobile handset, providing user visibility and creationof services around this visibility for merchants and banks.

FIG. 11 is an entity-relationship diagram illustrating secure identitybinding (SIB) system 1100, which may operate in conjunction with TIM400. An example of SIB is described with reference to near fieldcommunication (NFC) for purposes of illustration. Thus, NFC in thiscontext is used as an example of a communication layer only andembodiments of the invention neither rely nor depend on NFC technology,which is used merely as an instance of a generic communication channel.NFC is a point-to-point wireless communication technology (asdistinguished, e.g., from a protocol) that is based on the ISO 14443proximity-card standard. NFC uses short-range, high-frequency signals toenable two-way interaction between electronics devices. A device calleda “tag” (also referred to as an RFID tag) is commonly used inconjunction with NFC technology. A tag is a small physical object thatcan be attached to, or incorporated into a product. An RFID tag containswithin it a unique digital identifier (usually a numeric value.) Tagsare physically attached to a device that accepts payment (for example, alaundromat washing machine or a vending machine). Tags also containsilicon chips that enable them to receive and respond to queries from adevice called an RFID reader/writer. An NFC-enabled mobile phone alsocould be a tag reader.

An identity validation issue that arises in general is how to securely“bind” the tag to the device. That is, how to ensure that the tag doesindeed identify the physical device to which it is attached. Currenttechniques are typically based on physical binding such as gluing thetag to the device. Not only may this be expensive and presentmaintenance problems, it is also not secure. For example, an attackercould cover the original tag with electromagnetic shielding materialsuch as aluminum foil, and then attach the attacker's own spoofed tag ontop of the original one (thus impersonating the device) or simply swapthe tags on two devices. The outcome is the same: the identity-bindingassumption is violated.

Some tags are digitally signed. In this case the reader could verify theintegrity of the tag by way of verifying the digital signature embeddedin the tag (e.g., verifying the identity-binding using public keyinfrastructure (PKI)). The assumption of this verification is that thereader trusts the signer of the tag data by way of trusting the copy ofthe digital certificate that contains the public key of the signer.Signed-tag identity-binding verification does not solve theidentity-binding problem. In other words, signed-tag identity-bindingverification addresses the integrity verification of the tag itself butnot the secure binding between the tag and the device. This isconsidered a fundamental identity management problem and becomes evenmore important when financial transactions are involved in theinteractions between the tag and the device.

As illustrated in FIG. 11, identity-binding verification in accordancewith one or more embodiments implements a verifiable logical bindingthat does not rely on the unverifiable physical binding between the tag1102 and the device 1104. In a one-time operation, the tag identifier(referred to as “Tag ID”) is stored in a hardware secure storage 1106 onthe device using a trusted software component, e.g., trusted agent (TA)1108. Then every time that the tag 1102 is read by a reader 1110, suchas a mobile phone 510, the Tag ID is verified with the content of thehardware secure storage 1106, also referred to as secure vault 1106. Ifthere's a match, then the Tag ID is trusted and is presumed to representthe identity of the device 1104.

One embodiment requires the following components on the device 1104:secure vault 1106 and TA (trusted agent) 1108. The secure vault 1106 isa secure storage mechanism that holds private identifying key materialsuch as digital private keys. Secure vault 1106 could be hardware-basedsuch as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Mobile Trusted Module (MTM),embedded secure element (eSE), or it could be a software securityentity, such as a password-protected file such as a software key store.Hardware-based secure vaults are preferred as they potentially provide amuch higher level of protection and are not susceptible to software-onlyattacks (also known as system-wide attacks). Software-based securevaults are also possible, however, albeit possessing lower securitycharacteristics.

The trusted agent or TA 1108 is a software entity that is trusted andthe integrity of which is verified every time the TA 1108 is used. Forexample, TA 1108 may be a trusted remote attestation agent (TRAA) inaccordance with an embodiment and as described below with reference toFIG. 13. The presence of a TA 1108 on the reader 1110 (such as a mobilephone 510) is preferred but not necessary. That is, if other securitymechanisms exist on the reader 1110 that assert the trust, then theidentity-binding verification will be as effective as if there were a TA1108 present on the reader 1110. Reader 1110 may also have a securevault 1116.

Trust establishment and verification may be achieved as follows:

1) TA 1108 is created by the device manufacturer (or a trusted thirdparty, TTP) and is put on the device 1104.

2) A cryptographic, one-way, hash function of TA 1108 is calculated;call it H₁(TA).

3) H₁(TA) is digitally signed by a trusted entity called Trust Anchor1112 (for example, the FSP 1114 or a device manufacturer may also act asTrust Anchor 1112). The digital signature is a PKI operation which meansthat the Trust Anchor 1112 owns a pair of public and private keys(namely Key_(public) and Key_(private) respectively.) The H₁(TA) datapiece is digitally signed by Trust Anchor 1112 using its Key_(private).The signed hash of TA 1108 is referred to as S(H₁(TA), Key_(private))The notation S(H₁(TA), Key_(private)) does not indicate thatKey_(private) either appears or is somehow accessible in this dataentity; the notation is a conventional mathematical function notationindicating that Key_(private) is used for the calculation. The value ofKey_(private) can not be inferred from this data.

4) To verify the integrity of S(H₁(TA), Key_(private)) one only needs tohave access to, and trust the integrity of Key_(public) belonging toTrust Anchor 1112.

5) The digital signature verification process is a software operation,which may also be very fast. The software component that performsdigital signature verification is referred to as the V. The softwarecomponent “V” operates as: V(S(H₁(TA), Key_(private)), Key_(public)) andreturns TRUE or FALSE (meaning signature verification successful orfailed, respectively.)

6) To optimize the secure vault memory usage, a cryptographic one-wayhash function of Key_(public) is also calculated. Call itH₂(Key_(public)). H₁ and H₂ could be the same cryptographic one-way hashfunction or could be different cryptographic one-way hash functions.

7) Key_(public) is loaded into the device's 1104 general memory (e.g.,random access memory or RAM).

8) S(H₁(TA), Key_(private)) as well as H₂(Key_(public)) and V are storedin a read-only area of the memory of device 1104, such as read-onlymemory (ROM), for example, by the device manufacturer. V should alsoreside or be placed in an executable area of ROM.

9) Now the integrity and authenticity of TA 1108 can be verified—andthis verification can be trusted—every single time TA 1108 is used.Verification proceeds as:

-   -   9.1) V is executed in ROM of device 1104 (if ROM contains        executable area and V resides there). The trust on V is as        strong as the protection of ROM (which is hardware-protection,        meaning it is not susceptible to software-only attacks.)    -   9.2) H₂(Key_(public)) is calculated and verified against        H₂(Key_(public)) in the secure vault 1106. If verification        fails, then the device 1104 is considered tampered-with. If        verification succeeds, then Key_(public) (which is present in        RAM of device 1104) is considered trustworthy.    -   9.3) V(S(H₁(TA),Key_(private)),Key_(public)) is calculated. If V        succeeds (i.e. V returns TRUE) then TA 1108 can be trusted.        Otherwise the system 1100 is considered tampered-with.

10) At this point, assuming V succeeds, TA 1108 can be trusted, andtherefore whatever TA 1108 trusts can also be trusted. From this pointon TA 1108 accesses and verifies the Tag ID stored in secure vault 1106,and responds to reader's 1110 requests for Tag ID, Since TA 1108 istrusted, the responses of TA 1108 to requests are trusted.

The secure identity binding in accordance with one or more embodimentsinvolves a one-time-per-tag provisioning process. That is, once a tag1102 is attached to the device 1104, the Tag ID is read and stored inthe device's 1104 secure vault 1106 by the Trust Anchor 1112 and usingTA 1108. On subsequent tag 1102 replacements (e.g. for maintenancepurposes) the provisioning process may be repeated so that the Tag ID ofthe current tag 1102 always is present in the secure vault 1106. Furthersecurity augmentation could be implemented. For example, records of thedevice-tag ID, the GPS (Global Positioning System) location of thedevice, and other data could be stored within the FSP 1114infrastructure (such as TIM 400). This infrastructure could be consultedfor risk management operations and other security, authentication, andidentification purposes.

After the provisioning phase, whenever a reader 1110 (such as anNFC-enabled mobile phone or other consumer electronic device that couldbe used for payment) reads the Tag ID attached to the device 1104, thereader 1110 communicates that Tag ID to the device's 1104 TA 1108. Thecommunication between the reader 1110 and device's 1104 TA 1108 can betrusted because the communication happens between two trusted entities(e.g., the reader 1110 and device's 1104 TA 1108). Eavesdropping thiscommunication channel is difficult (for example, using NFC,communication occurs within a short proximity) and even if donesuccessfully, does not yield any useful attack vector for the attacker.The reason for this assertion is that the attacker has to be able tosuccessfully: 1) send a spoof signal (i.e. spoofed Tag ID) to the reader1110, and 2) block the response sent by device's 1104 TA1108.

The chances of satisfying the foregoing two conditions are miniscule inpractice. Now if the Tag ID reported by the reader 1110 does not matchthe Tag ID in the secure vault 1106 of device 1104, then the TA 1108responds with a “no-match” message back to the reader 1110, optionallylogs the event, puts the device on “hold” state as this might indicate atag-tampering or tag-replacing attempt. A “potential-tag-tampering”message could also be sent to the FSP 1114 infrastructure (by the device1104, reader 1110, or both) to put the device 1104 on an “elevated-risk”status and help FSP 1114 with its distributed risk managementinfrastructure (including, e.g., TIM 400).

If the device 1104 does not include a secure vault or TA, then the TagID could be sent to the FSP 1114 infrastructure (e.g. TIM 400 database)during the provisioning process. In this case, whenever a reader 1110attempts a transaction using such a Tag ID, then the GPS location of thereader 1110 (assuming the reader 1110 is GPS-capable) may be sent to FSP1114 infrastructure, and then FSP 1114 sends a message back to thereader 1110 with usable identifying information (including, for example,a message such as “our records show this is a vending machine, locatedin 2211 North First St., San Jose, Calif.”, or a picture of the device1104) that could assist the user of reader 1110 in determining whetherthe device 1104 is legitimate.

FIG. 12 is a system block diagram illustrating an example of ahardware-based zero knowledge strong authentication (H0KSA) system 1200.One of the fundamental pillars of security is strong authentication. Thestrongest form of authentication involves the combination of more thanone authentication factor. One such combination of factors may becategorized as: 1) what you know, e.g., passwords, passphrases; 2) whatyou have, e.g., hardware tokens, private keys; and 3) what you are,e.g., biometrics. When combined properly, these artifacts force anintruder to compromise several factors before being able to mount ameaningful attack. Although most strong authentication systems aresingle-factor systems, they can be combined with an additional factor,like a software or hardware token, to construct a multifactor system.What distinguishes strong authentication systems from other, weakerone-factor methods is the level of security that they leverage from thatone factor. A strong authentication system must protect even low-entropy(“guessable”) authentication methods from off-line attacks, even againstadversaries with complete access to the communication channel. Strongauthentication systems typically exchange a session key as well, whichenables both data confidentiality and integrity after authentication hasbeen successfully performed.

Many password authentication systems claim to solve this exact problem,and new password authentication systems are constantly being proposed.Although one can claim security by devising an authentication systemthat avoids sending the plaintext secrets (e.g., proofs) unencrypted, itis much more difficult to devise an authentication system that remainssecure when: 1) attackers have complete knowledge of the protocol; 2)attackers have access to a large dictionary of commonly used passwords;3) attackers can eavesdrop on all communications between client andserver; 4) attackers can intercept, modify, and forge arbitrary messagesbetween client and server; and 5) a mutually trusted third party is notavailable.

H0KSA system 1200 employs a strong authentication mechanism that isbased on “Zero Knowledge proof” and is augmented by hardware-basedprotection of secret key material, as well as optional biometrictechnologies on the client systems to initiate the authenticationprocess. H0KSA system 1200 solves the problem of secure authenticationin cases where the “prover” (e.g., a requester of authentication) mustown some secret material (such as private key material) and carries noother secret information, and where the “verifier” (e.g., the recipientof the authentication request, such as TIM 400) decides whether or notthe authentication request should be granted. H0KSA system 1200satisfies the following requirements: 1) system 1200 deployshardware-security modules to store the secret material on the clients;examples of hardware-security modules include: TPM (Trusted PlatformModule), MTM (Mobile Trusted Module), SE (secure element), eSE (embeddedsecure element), SD card (Secure Domain, a secure memory card such asTrustedFlash); 2) system 1200 may use biometric technologies (e.g.,biometric device 1212) to initiate the authentication process; 3) system1200 doesn't allow the attacker to impersonate the prover even if thecommunication channel between the prover and verifier is compromised; 4)system 1200 does not require a TTP (trusted third party) during theauthentication process; and 5) system 1200 consumes less power for thisoperation than the typical PKI-based authentication, which makes system1200 suitable also for battery-powered hand-held devices.

Many devices contain a form of hardware security module. The challengeis to properly deploy the hardware security module and leverage itscapabilities so that the applications that require protection could usethe hardware security module consistently and securely. A H0KSA system1200 accomplishes these tasks by storing the private key material in ahardware protected security device and allowing access to it onlythrough a secure and authenticated mechanism. This authenticationmechanism is based on Zero Knowledge Proof.

FIG. 12 illustrates one embodiment of a H0KSA system 1200 and itscomponents. Fundamental features of H0KSA system 1200 include 1)establishing unbroken, end-to-end (E2E) security 1202; and 2) enablingfast, power-efficient, and strong authentication. Each of these featuresis described below. System 1200, while very relevant for consumerelectronic devices (CED), is also applicable for non-CED environments.

An essential element of security is establishing an un-broken trustchain during both of two phases referred to as the authentication phaseand the channel protection phase. When the trust-chain is weakened,broken, or flawed, then hackers have an opportunity to exploit theweaknesses and attack the system. For example, assume that A and B needto authenticate each other prior to establishing a communicationchannel, as diagrammatically indicated by:

A←[communication channel]→B

A and B may be called end-points of the communication channel because inreal world scenarios the communication channel passes through multipleconnection points called hops, as diagrammatically indicated by:

A←[(hop_0)←→(hop_1)← . . . →(hop_n)]→B

End-points could be local (that is, the end-points reside within thesame device or execution environment) or the end-points could be foreign(that is, the end-points belong to different devices or executionenvironments.) One example of local end-points is the common design forcomputing devices such as a personal computer (PC), a laptop, or otherCEDs. An example of foreign end-points is that of two (usually)physically separate systems communicating remotely. In real lifescenarios the usual case is typically a hybrid one, for example, acombination of local and foreign end-points involved in communicationand data transfer.

An important characteristic of H0KSA system 1200 is the establishment ofa verifiable E2E (end-to-end) trust 1202 that is rooted in a hardwaresecurity module (HSM) 1204 that is referred to as root of trust (ROT)1206. The chain from ROT 1204, 1206 to the component using ROT 1206 iscalled chain of trust (COT) 1202. It is critically important that COT1202 satisfies the following two conditions at each step of the way,from hardware ROT 1204, 1206 up to the component that leverages ROT1206: 1) channel protection; and 2) mutual authentication. Acommunication channel satisfying these two conditions for each link(e.g. hop or step) in the channel is referred to as an unbroken chain oftrust. If the unbroken chain of trust extends from the first end point(e.g., the root of trust) to the second endpoint (e.g., point requiringauthentication), it is referred to as an end-to-end chain of trust.

Channel protection means that the communication channel between the twoend-points must be protected at each step of the way, as in the seconddiagram above. Channel protection also implies that the channel contentscan not be easily eavesdropped. That is, eavesdropping efforts would beeither very expensive, very time-consuming, or would require anontrivial level of technical knowledge commonly unavailable. This typeof channel protection is typically accomplished by using hardwareprotection, strong encryption, or both.

Mutual authentication means that at each step of the way, as in thesecond diagram above, the end-points of each communication-hopauthenticate each other. The mutual authentication condition can berelaxed if other protection mechanisms are in place, or if the risksassociated with relaxing this condition are miniscule, as far as systemE2E security (e.g. COT 1202) is concerned.

At this point and by meeting the conditions of channel protection andmutual authentication, the requirements for a first fundamental featureof H0KSA system 1200—that of establishing unbroken, E2E security—aremet. The following describes how the requirements for a secondfundamental feature of H0KSA system 1200—that of enabling fast,power-efficient, and strong authentication—are met.

HSM 1204 includes a hardware-protected area of memory which is referredto as a secure vault 1208. Hardware-protection in this context meansthat the contents of memory could only be accessed by privileged andauthenticated entities, hence the term secure vault 1208. To illustrateby example, assume that some private key material Key_((private)) (e.g.,some digital data that is not to be accessible to the general public) isstored in the secure vault 1208. Key_((private)) may possess thefollowing qualities: 1) Key_((private)) is unique, cannot be forged orguessed; it is hence the device's identity; 2) Key_((private)) isinaccessible by unauthenticated and unintended entities, becauseKey_((private)) is stored in secure vault 1208; and 3) Key_((private))can therefore be used to strongly authenticate the device 1210. Thesethree qualities satisfy the strong authentication requirement of thesecond fundamental feature of H0KSA system 1200.

Satisfaction of the fast and power-efficient conditions for the secondfundamental feature of H0KSA system 1200 is described as follows:Key_((private)) may be used as the proof-material for Zero KnowledgeProof of Knowledge. That is, the device 1210 stores the Key_((private))in the secure vault 1208 area of its HSM 1204, and then uses it toengage in a Zero Knowledge Proof with outside entities that need toauthenticate it. This mechanism guarantees that Key_((private)) remainsprivate. Zero Knowledge Proof implementations are much faster mechanismscompared to other mechanisms (about two orders of magnitude, forexample, compared to RSA-based identification schemes), and thereforerequire less computation (e.g., number of processing cycles). Thissatisfies the fast condition required for the second fundamental featureof H0KSA system 1200. There is a direct correlation between the numberof processing cycles and the power consumption of the device performingthe computation, hence satisfying the power-efficient condition requiredfor the second fundamental feature of H0KSA system 1200.

FIG. 12A illustrates a method 1280 for providing a hardware-basedzero-knowledge strong authentication according to the fundamentalfeatures of H0KSA system 1200. At step 1282, the method 1280 may protectsome secret information of any form that may be the subject of azero-knowledge proof. In one embodiment, the secret information may be aprivate key having characteristics described above—such as resistance toforgery or to being guessed, inaccessibility to unauthenticated andunintended entities—that make the private key suitable for uniquelyidentifying a device, for strongly authenticating the device, and forbeing the subject of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. Protection maybe accomplished, for example, using an HSM (e.g., HSM 1204), securevault (e.g., secure vault 1208), and use, for example, of a trustedagent (e.g., trusted agent 1108) for storing the secret material in thesecure vault.

At step 1284, method 1280 may establish an end-to-end chain of trustover a communication channel from one endpoint containing the secretmaterial to another endpoint requiring to authenticate the secretmaterial, satisfying the conditions described above, e.g., hardware orencryption (or both) protection of the channel and mutual authenticationof the endpoints. Each communication hop, or link, of the channel mayalso satisfy the same conditions, e.g., protection and endpoint mutualauthentication, in order for an unbroken chain of trust to be consideredestablished for the communication channel.

At step 1286, method 1280 may authenticate the secret material usingzero-knowledge proof over the end-to-end chain of trust established forthe communication channel. At step 1288, the zero-knowledge proof maycomprise a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge; the secret material may bea private key, suitable for identifying a device and suitable for use asproof material for zero-knowledge proof of knowledge; and the deviceitself may be authenticated while the secret material, i.e., the privatekey, remains private to the device.

Zero Knowledge Proof is a formal mathematical concept. One fundamentalquality of this class of formal proof systems is calledindistinguishability. Any mathematical proof system (such as ZeroKnowledge) has two classes of actors: prover (who proves the claim) andverifier (who verifies the proof offered by the prover.) To evaluate andassess the security and safety of the proof offered in such systems, theverifier is considered either an honest verifier (that is, the verifierfollows the proof system protocol verbatim) or a dishonest verifier(that is, the verifier does not follow the protocol verbatim.) Thistechnique allows the system to verify the correctness of the claimirrespective of whether the protocol suggested by the prover is followedby the verifier. An important side effect of this quality isindistinguishability. That is, in order for the proof to be asserted(meaning, no “knowledge” of the secret is released) it should beindistinguishable from verifier's point of view irrespective ofverifier's honesty. In simpler terms, no knowledge is leaked about thesecret, or the way that the possession of the secret is proved.

FIG. 13 is an entity-relationship diagram illustrating an MEP (mobileembedded payment) system 1300 and a trusted remote attestation agent(TRAA) 1302 and system level operational relationships. Determining thesecurity status of a mobile device (e.g., mobile terminal 1304) thatholds financial instruments is nontrivial. When such a device (e.g.,mobile terminal 1304) is offline (that is the communication with homenetwork 1306 (e.g., MNO cloud 1306), which is the network to which thedevice is subscribed to, becomes unavailable) performing this taskbecomes even more difficult because typical remote pulse-checktechniques are not applicable. For mobile phones (e.g., mobile terminal1304), one vector of attack for hackers to obtain privileged-access tothe terminal is to remove or otherwise disable the SIM (SubscriberIdentity Module) card 1308 and interrupt the communication channelbetween the phone 1304 and the mobile network 1306 and other endpointssuch as those of financial service providers (FSP) 1310. This type ofattack will ease the hackers' attempt to circumvent network-basedsecurity mechanisms that are put in place to protect the integrity andconfidentiality of financial instruments on the device. This willincrease the chance of mounting a successful attack and in turn resultsin an increased risk to financial institutions (e.g., bank 1314, FSP1310), thus hindering the efforts to enable offline transactioncapabilities on the mobile phone 1304.

TRAA 1302 addresses these problems by providing a set of pulse-checksteps to ensure that the security-sensitive connections (e.g.,connections 1305, 1309) are available and active. If a vital check failsthen a predetermined restriction may be enforced. The security providedby TRAA 1302 may be considered to be as good as the strength of theenforcement mechanism of restriction rules.

The security provided requires the presence of TRAA 1302 on the mobiledevice 1304. TRAA 1302 may be, for example, a software application thatsatisfies the following requirements:

1) TRAA 1302 is trustworthy itself. That is, TRAA 1302 is either storedin a hardware secure module such as eSE (embedded Secure Element) 1312or TPM (Trusted Platform Module), or its integrity can be verified andattested to. Mechanisms to establish this integrity check include (butnot limited to) digital signature verification or oblivious hashing (OH)techniques.

2) TRAA 1302 has knowledge of the same SIM card 1308 that was presentwhen the mobile phone was provisioned with the financial instrument byway of storing and protecting the SIM card's unique identifier value.(See, e.g., FIG. 9, arrows 902, 904 and arrows 922 through 924) This SIMcard is referred to as the provisioning-SIM 1308.

3) TRAA 1302 implements a method to periodically:

-   -   3.1) Verify self-integrity: if this verification fails, the        financial instruments on the phone 1304 are put in “lock-state”.        That is, the financial instruments need to be re-enabled by        calling the service center (mobile operator 1306, or financial        institution (e.g., bank 1314 or FSP 1310), or both.)    -   3.2) Check the existence of the provisioning-SIM: if this check        fails, then the financial instruments are put on “hold-state”.        That is, once the provisioning-SIM 1308 is available again the        financial instruments will become available to use.    -   3.3) Check the connectivity to MEP (Mobile Embedded Payment)        Backend services (e.g., TIM 400, FSP 1310). TIM 400 may be part        of FSP's 1310 infrastructure to support payment on consumer        electronics devices such as mobile phones 1304.    -   3.4) Check the connectivity 1305 to home mobile network 1306: if        this check fails, then the financial instruments are put on        “cap-state”. That is, a predetermined transaction cap (e.g. $20)        is enforced and transactions with a value above this amount are        denied until and unless all the vital checks (e.g., existence of        the provisioning-SIM 1308, connection 1309 to MEP Backend (e.g.,        TIM 400), and connection 1305 to home mobile network 1306)        become available.    -   3.5) The frequency of the above pulse-check mechanisms may be        tuned by the MEP system 1300 (e.g., TIM 400, FSP 1310).        Furthermore this may be a function of the risk-profile        associated with the user, mobile phone 1304, and the location        (e.g., using geo-location techniques with GPS) from where the        transactions are initiated.

TRAA is not limited strictly to mobile devices such as mobile phone1304, and may also be useful for other consumer electronicdevices—including, for example, NetTVs and NetTops—for which the SIM1308 may be substituted by another uniquely identifiable availablenetwork communication element.

FIG. 14 is an example of an interactive phishing detection (IPD) visualindicator 1402 in accordance with an embodiment. An important aspect ofany open model such as that of the Internet is, by definition, that theapplications can be written by anybody; not just the original source.That is, the mere fact that a viable business has legitimate services tooffer on its website does not stop malicious entities from posing as thegenuine website and harvesting users' credentials. This artifact of openmodels poses an important security challenge, which is how to identifyand stop a rogue application. An important class of rogue software isphishing applications. Phishing is defined as the process of attemptingto acquire sensitive information such as user credentials (e.g.,username, password, or credit card details) by masquerading as atrustworthy entity. Phishing is a nontrivial problem, solutions to whichmay require multiple entities in various layers of the ecosystem tocooperate and participate. As the problem is distributed, it makes sensethat solutions should likewise be so distributed.

Phishing-prevention is a highly complex problem; one that possesses bothtechnical and social-engineering facets. Determining whether anapplication is rogue, or otherwise unauthorized to perform an action isa nontrivial task that depends on many factors such as the OperatingSystem (OS) and the software platform (also referred to as stack) onwhich the application runs, its user interface (UI) composition, itsinteraction model with other applications and services, and many otherfactors. The definition of rogue itself is also very generic andimprecise. At an abstract level, solving the phishing problem isequivalent to identifying and allowing an authentic application (andconsequently allowing it to acquire the aforesaid credentials) and atthe same time identifying and disallowing a rogue application, whichimpersonates as an authentic application. Therefore it is important todefine the objective of the solution.

The main objective of the solution may be defined as interactivephishing detection (IPD). Any of MEP systems 500, 600, 700, and 800 mayinclude an IPD module 4704 as part of TIM 400, as shown in FIG. 4B. Thesolution (e.g., implementation via IPD module 4704) does not attempt toprevent phishing, as that would require enumerating all the phishingattacks possible, which is practically impossible. Thus we furtherconfine the scope of the solution as: A) enabling users to securelydetermine whether an application is authentic; and B) functionality ofIPD is initiated by the end user who intends to verify the authenticityof the application. The restrictions A and B imply that the solutionrelies on the user's intention and invocation of IPD (e.g., via IPDmodule 4704 included in device management module 470) is not necessarilyautomatic. One example of a practical use of IPD is to assert theauthenticity of an FSP payment engine, embedded in another applicationthat requires payment functionality.

An embodiment of IPD may include two components: a client component(e.g., mobile phone 510) and a server component (e.g. TIM 400 includingIPE module 4704). The client component resides on the target device(e.g., mobile phone 510, personal computer, laptop, mobile handset) thatsatisfies the following general requirements: 1) is network-aware; 2) isitself trustworthy; 3) contains a UI (user interface) element; 4) has averification engine; 5) can be embedded or standalone; 6) itstrustworthiness can be verified (i.e. can be authenticated).

The client component (e.g., mobile phone 510) is called a Trust Base, asit is able to establish and verify a trust claim (i.e. it is nottampered with). At a high-level and with the characteristics mentionedabove, the Trust Base ensures that when an application is being executedand while it is obtaining users' credentials (and if the user choosesto) the authenticity of all the elements involved in the process can beverified. If this verification fails, then the user is notified via avisual indicator provided by the UI element, which in turn indicates apossible phishing attempt.

The server component (e.g. TIM 400 including IPD module 4704) is calleda Trust Source as it generates verification material in a random mannerthat can be obtained by the client component, and also can be visuallyverified by the user. For example, the verification material can be ared, or other color or shading, button with a three-digit number in itforming an IPD visual indicator 1402, as seen in FIG. 14.

For the IPD visual indicator 1402 example, the button color and thenumbers within it change randomly and periodically. This IPD visualindicator 1402 button is shown, for example, at a standard location onthe Trust Source website (e.g., a website of the FSP 1310).

One implementation of IPD works as follows. When the user decides toverify whether the questionable software is authentic:

1) User clicks on the verify button (available, e.g., on the UIcomponent of the client 510);

2) Verify button forces the verification engine to authenticate theclient 510 to the server 400;

3) Upon a successful authentication of the client 510 by the server 400:

-   -   a) The client 510 verification engine retrieves the current        color settings (for the button and the number) as well as the        digit value of the IPD visual indicator 1402 from server 400;    -   b) The UI component of the client 510 shows the button with the        color setting and number of the IPD visual indicator 1402        retrieved by the client 510 verification engine.

4) User visits the Trust Source site (e.g. website of the FSP 1310) andverifies that the color and number of the IPD visual indicator 1402shown by the verify button of the user's client 510 component is thesame as the one displayed on the Trust Source site.

The server (e.g., TIM 400) component only responds to an authenticclient (e.g., mobile phone 510) component, as there is an authenticationstep required by the server (e.g., TIM 400) to send any response. Arogue application would not be able to authenticate, and can only guessthe correct combination of colors and numbers. Since this combination israndomly set on the server (e.g., TIM 400 of Trust Source website of theFSP 1310), and is also changing periodically, the window of opportunityfor the rogue application is severely limited.

In implementation of the various embodiments, embodiments of theinvention may comprise a personal computing device, such as a personalcomputer, laptop, PDA, cellular phone or other personal computing orcommunication devices. The payment provider system may comprise anetwork computing device, such as a server or a plurality of servers,computers, or processors, combined to define a computer system ornetwork to provide the payment services provided by a payment providersystem.

In this regard, a computer system may include a bus or othercommunication mechanism for communicating information, whichinterconnects subsystems and components, such as processing component(e.g., processor, micro-controller, digital signal processor (DSP),etc.), system memory component (e.g., RAM), static storage component(e.g., ROM), disk drive component (e.g., magnetic or optical), networkinterface component (e.g., modem or Ethernet card), display component(e.g., CRT or LCD), input component (e.g., keyboard or keypad), and/orcursor control component (e.g., mouse or trackball). In one embodiment,disk drive component may comprise a database having one or more diskdrive components.

The computer system may perform specific operations by processor andexecuting one or more sequences of one or more instructions contained ina system memory component. Such instructions may be read into the systemmemory component from another computer readable medium, such as staticstorage component or disk drive component. In other embodiments,hard-wired circuitry may be used in place of or in combination withsoftware instructions to implement the invention.

Logic may be encoded in a computer readable medium, which may refer toany medium that participates in providing instructions to the processorfor execution. Such a medium may take many forms, including but notlimited to, non-volatile media, volatile media, and transmission media.In various implementations, non-volatile media includes optical ormagnetic disks, such as disk drive component, volatile media includesdynamic memory, such as system memory component, and transmission mediaincludes coaxial cables, copper wire, and fiber optics, including wiresthat comprise bus. In one example, transmission media may take the formof acoustic or light waves, such as those generated during radio waveand infrared data communications.

Some common forms of computer readable media include, for example,floppy disk, flexible disk, hard disk, magnetic tape, any other magneticmedium, CD-ROM, any other optical medium, punch cards, paper tape, anyother physical medium with patterns of holes, RAM, ROM, EPROM,FLASH-EPROM, any other memory chip or cartridge, carrier wave, or anyother medium from which a computer is adapted.

In various embodiments, execution of instruction sequences forpracticing the invention may be performed by a computer system. Invarious other embodiments, a plurality of computer systems coupled bycommunication link (e.g., LAN, WLAN, PTSN, or various other wired orwireless networks) may perform instruction sequences to practice theinvention in coordination with one another.

Computer system may transmit and receive messages, data, information andinstructions, including one or more programs (i.e., application code)through communication link and communication interface. Received programcode may be executed by processor as received and/or stored in diskdrive component or some other non-volatile storage component forexecution.

Where applicable, various embodiments provided by the present disclosuremay be implemented using hardware, software, or combinations of hardwareand software. Also, where applicable, the various hardware componentsand/or software components set forth herein may be combined intocomposite components comprising software, hardware, and/or both withoutdeparting from the spirit of the present disclosure. Where applicable,the various hardware components and/or software components set forthherein may be separated into sub-components comprising software,hardware, or both without departing from the scope of the presentdisclosure. In addition, where applicable, it is contemplated thatsoftware components may be implemented as hardware components andvice-versa.

Software, in accordance with the present disclosure, such as programcode and/or data, may be stored on one or more computer readablemediums. It is also contemplated that software identified herein may beimplemented using one or more general purpose or specific purposecomputers and/or computer systems, networked and/or otherwise. Whereapplicable, the ordering of various steps described herein may bechanged, combined into composite steps, and/or separated into sub-stepsto provide features described herein.

The foregoing disclosure is not intended to limit the present inventionto the precise forms or particular fields of use disclosed. It iscontemplated that various alternate embodiments and/or modifications tothe present invention, whether explicitly described or implied herein,are possible in light of the disclosure. Having thus described variousexample embodiments of the disclosure, persons of ordinary skill in theart will recognize that changes may be made in form and detail withoutdeparting from the scope of the invention. Thus, the invention islimited only by the claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A user device configured to communicate with averifying device that is distinct from the user device, the user devicecomprising: a hardware security module (HSM) controlling access to asecret material stored within the HSM that-provides a basis for azero-knowledge proof authentication of the user device over acommunication channel that provides a chain of trust between the userdevice and the verifying device, with a mutual authentication betweenendpoints of each hop of the chain of trust; and a tag configured to bereadable by the verifying device to convey a tag identifier; wherein theuser device is configured to: respond to the verifying device in thezero-knowledge proof authentication of the user device; receive, afterthe user device completes the zero-knowledge proof authentication, theconveyed tag identifier from the verifying device via the communicationchannel; and in response to determining that the received conveyed tagidentifier matches a stored tag identifier stored within the HSM,communicate to the verifying device using the chain of trust that thereceived conveyed tag identifier is trusted as representing the identityof the user device.
 2. The user device of claim 1, wherein: the secretmaterial is a private key material; the private key material is uniqueand resistant to forgery and to being guessed such that the private keymaterial serves as an identity of the user device; and the private keymaterial is a proof material for the zero-knowledge proof toauthenticate the user device.
 3. The user device of claim 1, wherein:the secret material is a private key material; the private key materialis unique such that the private key material serves as an identity ofthe user device; the private key material is a proof material for thezero-knowledge proof to authenticate the user device; and the privatekey material remains private after the zero-knowledge proofauthentication of the device is completed such that the private keymaterial is not disclosed to the verifying device.
 4. The user device ofclaim 1, wherein: the HSM includes a secure vault; the secret materialis stored in the secure vault; and the secure vault provideshardware-based protection of the secret material.
 5. The user device ofclaim 1, wherein the HSM comprises at least one of a Trusted PlatformModule (TPM), a Mobile Trusted Module (MTM), a secure element (SE), anembedded secure element (eSE), a secure memory card, a Secure Domain(SD) card, or a Trusted Flash memory.
 6. The user device of claim 1,wherein the communication channel is protected by encryption.
 7. Theuser device of claim 1, wherein the communication channel is hardwareprotected.
 8. The user device of claim 1, wherein: the communicationchannel includes one or more communication hops, each hop having twoendpoints, wherein each hop of the communication channel is protected;and the endpoints of each hop mutually authenticate each other such thatthe communication channel provides an end-to-end chain of trust from theuser device to the verifying device.
 9. The user device of claim 1,further comprising a biometric device in response to an activation ofwhich by a user, the user device is configured to initiate a request forthe zero-knowledge proof authentication.
 10. A method comprising:establishing a chain of trust over a communication channel between auser device having a tag, configured to be readable by a verifyingdevice to convey a tag identifier, and the verifying device, with amutual authentication between endpoints of each hop of the chain oftrust; controlling access to a secret material in a hardware securitymodule of the user device to provide a zero-knowledge proofauthentication of the user device via the chain of trust; engaging withthe verifying device in the zero-knowledge proof authentication of theuser device; receiving, by the user device after the user devicecompletes the zero-knowledge proof authentication, the conveyed tagidentifier from the verifying device via the chain of trust; and inresponse to determining that the received tag identifier matches astored tag identifier stored within the hardware security module,communicating by the user device to the verifying device via the chainof trust that the conveyed tag identifier is trusted as representing theidentity of the user device.
 11. The method of claim 10, wherein thesecret material serves to uniquely identify the user device.
 12. Themethod of claim 10, further comprising: authenticating the user deviceusing the secret material as proof material in a zero-knowledge proofwherein the secret material remains private after authentication of theuser device.
 13. The method of claim 10, further comprising: protectingthe secret material by providing hardware protection including storingthe secret material in a secure vault comprising a read-only memory(ROM).
 14. The method of claim 10, further comprising: protecting thesecret material by using a trusted agent to store the secret material ina secure vault.
 15. The method of claim 10, further comprising:protecting the secret material by storing the secret material in atleast one of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a Mobile Trusted Module(MTM), a secure element (SE), an embedded secure element (eSE), a securememory card, a Secure Domain (SD) card, or a Trusted Flash memory. 16.The method of claim 10, wherein establishing the chain of trustcomprises protecting the communication channel by encryption.
 17. Themethod of claim 10, wherein establishing the chain of trust comprisesproviding hardware protection for the communication channel.
 18. Themethod of claim 10, wherein: the communication channel includes one ormore communication hops, each hop having two endpoints; and establishingthe chain of trust further comprises: protecting each hop of thecommunication channel; and mutually authenticating each other by theendpoints of each hop to establish an end-to-end chain of trust.
 19. Themethod of claim 10, further comprising: establishing an end-to-end chainof trust over the communication channel, wherein: the communicationchannel has two endpoints, the hardware security module being at a firstendpoint and the verifying device being at a second endpoint; and anunbroken chain of trust is established between the first endpoint andthe second endpoint of the communication channel.
 20. A non-transitorymachine-readable medium having stored thereon machine-readableinstructions executable to cause a machine to perform operationscomprising: establishing a chain of trust over a communication channelbetween a user device having a tag, configured to be readable by averifying device to convey a tag identifier, and the verifying device,with a mutual authentication between endpoints of each hop of the chainof trust; controlling access to a secret material in a hardware securitymodule of the user device to provide a zero-knowledge proofauthentication of the user device via the chain of trust; responding tothe verifying device in the zero-knowledge proof authentication of theuser device; receiving, by the user device after the user devicecompletes the zero-knowledge proof authentication, the conveyed tagidentifier from the verifying device via the chain of trust; and inresponse to determining that the received tag identifier matches astored tag identifier stored within the hardware security module,communicating by the user device to the verifying device that theconveyed tag identifier is trusted as representing the identity of theuser device.